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LEARNING FROM BELOW: THEORISING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH
ETHNOGRAPHIES AND CRITICAL REFLECTIONS FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH
Sujith Xavier*
This paper explores the various means by which we can overcome the universalism
imbedded in international law and international institutions. It asks: How can
international lawyers and international law scholars learn from the Global South? This
‘how’ question prompts another, but related question: should we learn from the Global
South?
There is a rich interdisciplinary body of literature that signals to the Global South, or
Europe’s other, as a site of knowledge production. The eurocentrism of the social
sciences can be identified by examining the various founding fathers of their respective
theories (especially sociology). This paper builds on southern theory in order to learn
from these diverse perspectives in theorising global governance.
This paper is organised in three sections. First, it sets out the rationale for a
reorientation towards the Global South by examining the current state of global
governance theory. In the second section, this paper focus on the broad theoretical
foundations of the Third World Approaches to International Law [TWAIL] movement.
TWAIL scholarship is a reaction against the colonial and imperial projects of
international law. Its main claims are set out and then there is an examination of its
proposals as a means to arrive at an answer to the second question: should we learn
from the Global South?
In the final section, this paper explores the question of how we can learn from the
Global South. In answering this question, the author offers two insights. The first is based
on the premise of international law as a field of practice. The second attempts to
problematise the ethics of international legal scholarship.
Dans cet article, l’auteur examine les divers moyens par lesquels on peut surmonter
l’universalisme dont le droit international et les institutions internationales sont pétris. Il
pose la question de savoir comment les avocats en droit international et les universitaires
faisant des travaux en droit international peuvent apprendre quelque chose du Sud. Cette
question en soulève une autre, qui est liée : celle de savoir si nous devrions apprendre
quelque chose du Sud.
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Il existe un riche corpus interdisciplinaire d’écrits qui indiquent que le Sud ou l’autre
périphérie de l’Europe sont des lieux de production de connaissances. On peut déceler
l’eurocentrisme des sciences sociales en étudiant les différents pères fondateurs de leurs
théories respectives (surtout en sociologie). Dans cet article, l’auteur fait fond sur la
théorie du Sud pour tirer des enseignements de ces diverses perspectives en formulant
une théorie sur la gouvernance mondiale.
Cet article est divisé en trois parties. Dans la première, l’auteur expose la justification
d’une réorientation vers le Sud en étudiant l’état de la théorie de la gouvernance
mondiale. La deuxième partie porte sur les fondements théoriques généraux du
mouvement Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). La mission
universitaire de TWAIL est une réaction contre les projets de droit international
coloniaux et impérialistes. L’auteur expose les principales assertions de ce mouvement,
puis il examine ses propositions comme moyen d’arriver à une réponse à la seconde
question, qui est de savoir si nous devrions apprendre quelque chose du Sud.
Dans la troisième et dernière partie, l’auteur analyse la question de savoir comment
nous pouvons apprendre quelque chose du Sud. En y répondant, il présente deux
théories. La première est fondée sur la prémisse posant le droit international comme
champ d’exercice. La deuxième tente de poser le problème de l’éthique de la recherche
universitaire en droit international.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a democracy deficit in contemporary global governance. The deficit stems from a lack of
participation and accountability within international institutions. The democracy deficit is often credited
to the various modes of globalisation(s)1, fragmentation of international law and its institutions2.
International legal scholars and international lawyers theorise global governance using multiple
theoretical perspectives.3 Scholars and practitioners working in this type of theory production suggest
that it is possible to usher in accountability and legitimacy through global constitutionalism and global
administrative law.4 There are a number of limitations to this type of theory.5
1

2
3

4

Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation (London:
Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002) at 179 [Santos, New Legal Common Sense]; Boaventura de Sousa Santos,
“Globalizations” (2006) 23 Theory Culture Society 292 at 296 [Santos, “Globalizations”].
Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, “Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law” (2006)
17:3 Eur J Intl L 483 at 484.
Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, “Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators” in Kevin
Davis et al, eds, Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015) at 10-21.
Jeffrey L Dunoff & Joel P Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization” in Jeffrey L
Dunoff & Joel P Trachtman, eds, Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 5-9; Peters & Armingeon regard it as “constitutionalist spectacles”,
Anne Peters & Klaus Armingeon, “Introduction—Global Constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary Perspective”
(2009) 16:2 Ind J Global Leg Stud 385 at 385; Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, “Introduction: Global Governance
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A handful of scholars have already sought to provide incisive critiques of these moves to transfer
domestic conceptions of law to the global sphere.6 In this paper, my central aim is to ask: how can we7
learn from the Global South in theorising global governance? Ultimately, this paper proposes a deep
engagement with scholarly interventions that explore the lived realities of the people of the Global
South.
There are various forms of global governance theories. Global legal pluralism8 and transnational legal
pluralism9, for example, attempt to move beyond domestic analogies. However, in this paper, I focus on
two theories that borrow from domestic conceptions of law: global constitutionalism and global
administrative law.
Global constitutionalism identifies existing legitimacy-producing mechanisms in international law
and its institutions. Scholars suggest that international law and its institutions exhibit characteristics akin
to constitutionalism and constitutionalisation.10 They further argue that international law should be used
to create a better world by imagining a constitutional future.11 The United Nations Charter, for example,
is imagined as a world constitution.12
Global administrative law focuses on global governance as administration.13 Contemporary
international institutions are making use of administrative law principles.14 Some scholars that work on
global administrative law are from Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. They identify administrative law norms

5

6

7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14

and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order” (2006) 17 Eur J Intl L 1; Benedict Kingsbury, “The
Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance” (2005) American Society of International Proceedings 143.
Martin Loughlin, “Constitutional Pluralism: An Oxymoron?” (2014) 3:1 Global Constitutionalism 9 at 14; Carol Harlow,
"Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values" (2006) 17:1 Eur J Intl L 187 at 190; BS Chimni,
“International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making” 15:1 Eur J Intl L; Susan Marks, “Naming
Global Administrative Law” (2005) 37 NYUJ Intl L & Pol 995 at 995.
BS Chimni, “Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law” (2006) 37 NYUJ Intl L & Pol 799
[Chimni, “Co-option”]; Zoran Oklopcic, “Provincializing Constitutional Pluralism” (2014) 5:3 Transnational Legal
Theory 331.
The “we” that this paper is concerned with includes scholars from the Global North and Global South, and legal
practitioners from the Global North and Global South. For a greater examination of my own subject position as it relates
to the Global South, see Sujith Xavier, Global Governance, Global Constitutionalism & Global Administrative Law:
False Universalisms? (PhD Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2015) [unpublished] [Xavier, False Universalisms].
Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Legal Pluralism” (2010) 1:2 Transnational Leg Theory 141.
David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus (London: Polity Press,
2004); Jürgen Habermas, Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).
Ibid.
Neil Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context” in Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek, eds, Constitutional
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) at 17; A similar argument was recently
made by global administrative law scholars, see Richard B Stewart, “The Normative Dimensions and Performance of
Global Administrative Law" (2015) 13 (2) Intl J Constitutional L 499 at 500 [Stewart, “Normative Dimensions”].
Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 1998).
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law” (2005) 68 Law
and Contemporary Problems 15.
Ibid; Karl-Heinz Ladeur, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and Transnational Regulation” (2013) 3:3
Transnational Leg Theory 243.
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within international regimes by analogising from their national administrative framework.15 This type of
analogising contributes to the universalising nature of international law.
Global administrative lawyers argue that the entire collection of norms, principles and doctrines that
weave together domestic administrative law can be found within the regulatory structure of global
governance institutions.16 By demonstrating the presence, or possibilities, of these norms, they suggest
that the current international regulatory framework explicitly embodies or has the potential to produce
accountability.17 Richard Stewart, one of the founders of global administrative law has suggested that:
“Despite vast differences in institutional and political circumstances, experience confirms that use of
administrative law mechanisms in global administration can help protect the rights of individuals
threatened with sanctions and […] secure greater regard for the politically weak and vulnerable”.18
There are a number of problems with these attempts to usher in legitimacy and accountability within
international law and its institutions. The central shortcoming of these two theories described above is
that they ignore and obscure the true nature of international law and its institutions. This is nonetheless
part of a larger trend in international law. This trend can be characterised as an attempt to deploy the
western particular (i.e. notions of Canadian19 or European20 constitutional law or notions of American21
or German22 administrative law) as a universal norm, applicable worldwide.
This endemic aspect of international law can be rooted in its history and the manner in which it was
forged. The beginnings of international law are imbricated in a narrative of western universalism,
starting with the manner in which the sovereignty doctrine was created.23 Irene Watson chronicles this
process and suggests that “an evolving international law constituted by colonialism padded the relations
between the rival colonial powers. To conceal its evil intent, colonialism was badged as a civilising
mission, a mission to convert savagery into the universal civilisation of Europe”.24 This facet of
international law has enduring legacies that have affected its development and continues to affect its
institutions and doctrines. Much more importantly, these relics of colonialism and imperialism affect
and influence the manner in which we theorise international law and its institutions now.25

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Sabino Cassese et al, “Foreword” in Sabino Cassese et al, eds, Global Administrative Law: The Casebook (Rome
Edinburgh New York: ILRP, 2012) at xxiii.
Ibid at xxiv.
Sujith Xavier, “Theorising Global Governance Inside Out: A Response to Professor Ladeur” (2013) 3 Transnational Leg
Theory 268 [Xavier, “Response to Ladeur”].
Stewart, “Normative Dimensions”, supra note 11 at 500.
Ronald St John Macdonald & DM Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal Ordering of the
World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005).
Peters & Armingeon, supra note 4.
Kingsbury, supra note 4.
Ladeur, supra note 14.
Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004) [Anghie, Imperialism].
Irene Watson, Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law: Raw Law (New York: Routledge, 2015) at 6.
For a recent attempt to demonstrate the universalism of international law and international institutions, see Sundhya
Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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This paper explores the various means by which we can overcome the universalism imbedded in
international law and international institutions by asking: How can international lawyers and
international law scholars learn26 from the Global South? The ‘how’ question prompts another, but
related question: should we learn from the Global South?27
This paper builds on current literature on the Global South or what Raewyn Connell has coined
“southern theory” in order to learn from diverse perspectives in theorising global governance.28 There is
a rich interdisciplinary body of literature that signals to the Global South, or Europe’s other, as a site of
knowledge production. This particular body of work, at times cited to as alternative discourses, focuses
on the “eurocentrism and often irrelevancy of mainstream discourses”.29 The eurocentrism of social
sciences can be identified by examining the various founding fathers of their respective theories
(especially sociology).30
Sociologists have sought to open up space to think about the contribution of the Global South to our
understanding of modernity. They then hope to reconstruct their field through the lens of connected
sociologies.31 In the socio-legal context, a similar move is apparent in Boaventura De Sousa Santos’
scholarship. He expressly calls for such a reorientation to the Global South.32 Santos argues that in the
current socio-economic-political climate, we need theories that are not “vanguard”; rather, we need
“rearguard” theories. He suggests that contemporary theoretical analysis should focus on social
movements by asking questions, creating linkage with other social movements, overcoming difference
and building bridges. He argues that we must “facilitate interactions with those that walk more slowly
[...]” in places that were ignored or made invisible by “the Eurocentric critical tradition” .33
Within legal spaces, other scholars have posited examples from the Global South as an interruption to
the Eurocentric focus on constitutional theory.34 They challenge the manner in which we imagine the
Global South. They argue that the Global South is not a carbon copy of the North; rather, it is unique in
26

27
28
29
30
31
32

33
34

For another account of a similar project in the context of international environmental law, see Kishan Khoday & Usha
Natarajan, “Fairness and International Environmental Law from Below: Social Movements and Legal Transformation in
India” (2012) 25 Leiden J Intl L 415.
This second question is prompted by Sundhya Pahuja’s astute reflection during an informal conversation during the
TWAIL 2015 Cairo conference: should we theorise global governance from the perspectives of the Global South?
Raewyn Connell, Southern Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).
Syed Farid Alatas, "An Introduction to the Idea of Alternative Discourses" (2000) 28:1 Southeast Asian J of Social
Science 1.
Raewyn Connell, Southern Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 2007) at 4-18.
Gurminder K Bhambra, Connected Sociologies (London: Bloomsbury, 2014) at 3.
Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa (The
Radical Imagination) (London: Paradigm, 2012) [Comaroff and Comaroff]; Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, “Introduction”
in Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, ed, Constitutionalism of the Global South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
1 [Bonilla, “Introduction”].
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide (London: Paradigm Publisher,
2014) at 44 [Santos, Epistemologies].
Bonilla, “Introduction”, supra note 32; Jackie Dugard, “Courts and Structural Poverty in South Africa: To what extent
has the Constitutional Court expanded access and remedies to the poor?” in Bonilla, supra note 32, 293; Manuel
Iturralde, “Access to Constitutional Justice in Colombia: Opportunities and Challenges for Social and Political Change”
in ibid, 361; Menaka Guruswamy & Bipin Aspatwar, “Access to Justice in India: The Jurisprudence (and SelfPerception) of the Supreme Court” in ibid, 329.
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its development. This development therefore should be celebrated. From this vantage point, turning to
the Global South provides an opportunity to glean new insights about international law and its
institutions.
But what exactly do I mean by the Global South? My understanding of the Global South is built on
interdisciplinary scholarship that shifts beyond the category of the Third World while retaining its
salient features.35 The Global South is constructed through connected histories36 and connected
sociologies.37 The connected histories call for an understanding of world history as world histories,
structured by connected processes rather than fixed events.38 Bhambra’s connected sociologies suggests
a broader understanding of events that transcend our normal ordering of the world based on Eurocentric
modernity to one that reconstructs the possibilities of our world.
My understanding of the Global South is one that aligns with Jean and John Comaroff’s suggestion
that it is a polythetic category where it has multiple features.39 They thus argue that the Global South
“assumes meaning by virtue not of its content, but of its context, […] to its antinomy to ‘the Global
North’, an opposition that carries a great deal of imaginative baggage congealed around the contrast
between centrality and marginality, free-market modernity and its absence”.40 It is thus something that
cannot be defined and its material contents are determined by “everyday material and political
processes”.41 The everyday material reality is one that can be located in Attawapiskat First Nation in
Northern Ontario, Canada or in the rural war ravaged villages of Vanni, Northern Province of Sri Lanka.
Vijay Prashad suggests that the Global South signifies a form of resistance to the transformations
described above as the coming together of various forces. This is another layer that can be added to our
existing understating of the Global South. Prashad argues that given the manner in which world politics
operates, especially as a result of neoliberalism, the Global South has come to be identified with protests
“against the theft of the commons, against the theft of human dignity and rights, against the undermining
of democratic institutions […]”.42
The Global South is a condition brought about by various forces of history including colonialism,
imperialism, capitalism and resistance. It describes a relationship between the colonised and coloniser,
as shaped by the forces of globalisation. Ultimately, it captures power relations at all levels between
communities inside and outside established borders. The Global South does not encompass and fixate on
one historical moment of first contact between Europeans and the “savages”. Rather the Global South, in
35

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

See Xavier et al, “Placing TWAIL Scholarship and Praxis (Introduction to the Special issue of the Windsor Yearbook of
Access to Justice)” (2016) 33:3 Windsor YB Access Just v; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Locating the Third World in
Cultural Geography” (2000) 15:2 Third World Legal Stud 1; Karin Mickelson, “Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices
in International Legal Discourse” (1998) 16:2 Wis Intl LJ 35; BS Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International
Law: A Manifesto” (2006) 8 Intl Community L Rev 3.
Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia" (1997) 31:3
Mod Asian Stud 735 at 745.
Bhambra, supra note 31.
Subrahmanyam, supra note 36 at 759-62.
Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 32 at 45.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Vijay Prashad, Poorer Nations (London: Verso, 2014) at 9. This point was made earlier by Boaventura de Sousa Santos
as insurgent cosmopolitanism; Santos, New Legal Common Sense, supra note 1.
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my reading, is a space in which colonialism and imperialism, along with fast-paced growth through
modern technologies, facilitate connections and dependencies. One crucial aspect of the term Global
South is recognition that there are multitudes of claims in various spaces that are both emancipatory and
oppressive. In particular, the possibility of a south in the North and a north in the South is key. This
speaks to the recognition of Indigenous groups in the Global North as engendering a Fourth World.43
That said, we should be careful not to conflate Indigenous struggles for sovereignty with Global
South struggles for equity, access and redistribution. The very logics of settler colonialism44 and external
colonialism45 have bifurcated these two axes of resistance.46 While similarities do exist between these
two types of resistance, the bifurcation has resulted in Indigenous peoples’ claims being rooted to their
indigenous lands and their own legal culture while the Global South claims are based on the search for
further equality and equity. While noting the difference in these types of movements, my understanding
of the Global South encapsulates a number of various claims predicated on historical progress, which
includes Indigenous peoples, migrants, enslaved peoples and their descendants of the Global North.
These various complex but nuanced descriptions of the Global South are important and shape the
direction of this paper. Ultimately, by adopting this broad and all-encompassing definition of the Global
South, I hope to create new avenues to transcend the limitation of western universalism rooted within
the global governance theories.
This paper is organised in three sections. In what follows, I will set out the rationale for a
reorientation towards the Global South by examining the current state of global governance theory. In
the second section, I will focus on the broad theoretical foundations of the Third World Approaches to
International Law [TWAIL] movement. TWAIL scholarship is a reaction against the colonial and
imperial projects of international law. I set out its main claims and then examine its proposals as a
means to arrive at an answer to the question: should we learn from the Global South?
Then, I explore the question of how we can learn from the Global South. In answering this question, I
offer two insights. The first is based on the premise of international law as a field of practice. Often,
international lawyers and international law scholars tend to examine the legal mechanisms and the
ensuing doctrines of international law without reference to geo-political, economic, social, and cultural
contexts. Thinking about international law as a field of practice rather than solely focusing on issues of
legality, can illuminate international law’s unlit corners that are constituted by diverse sets of forces at
play in today’s society. In order to focus on international law as a field of practice, we must gather more
insights about international law and its institutions through ethnographies. The second insight that I offer
attempts to problematise the ethics of international legal scholarship. In this regard, I focus on the role of
international lawyers and international law scholars and their ethical obligations in light of the material
reality of the Global South.
43
44
45
46

Amar Bhatia, “The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to International Law with Lessons from the
Fourth World” (2012) 14:1 Or Rev Intl L 131.
Patrick Wolfe, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native” (2006) 8:4 J Genocide Research 387.
Eve Tuck & Wayne Yang, "Decolonization is not a metaphor" (2012) 1:2 Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education &
Society 1.
Maile Arvin, Eve Tuck, & Angie Morrill, "Decolonizing Feminism: Challenging Connections between Settler
Colonialism and Heteropatriarchy" (2013) 25:1 Feminist Formations 8 at 11-12.
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Importantly, this contribution to the Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice TWAIL special issue is
framed as an ambitious project. Some of the pieces included in this issue seek to transcend the
limitations of global governance theories. The theories that are central to my analysis are global
constitutionalism and global administrative law. These two theories attempt to usher in accountability to
global governance institutions as means to overcome various limitations brought about by the
democracy deficit alluded to earlier. There are a number of broad claims that are advanced in this paper.
I frame them in this fashion as means to build bridges between different disciplinary silos of global
governance, mainstream international law, Third World Approaches to International Law and other
disciplines that have gestured towards the Global South as a site of knowledge production.
II. STATE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THEORY
In his 2013 collection of essays titled, Constitutionalism of the Global South, Daniel Bonilla
examines the state of contemporary constitutional theory. His scholarly contribution is to ask how the
Colombian Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, and the Indian Supreme
Court can contribute to modern understandings of constitutionalism.47 His starting point is to recognise
the Eurocentricism in constitutional theory. Constitutionalism is usually reliant upon western legal
thinkers, which results in the exclusion of knowledge production from the Global South. Bonilla
characterises this as the relegation of legal thinkers from the Global South to “particularly low level”
priority and importance.48 This premise is a good starting point when thinking about contemporary
global governance theory.
Bonilla makes five specific arguments in support of his thesis that constitutionalism is reliant upon
western legal thinkers. First, the legal systems in the Global South are thought to reproduce the legal
systems of the Global North. Second, western contributions to legal theory and the adoption of the
western legal systems by countries in the Global South have reified the claim that the legal systems of
the Global South are similar to the legal systems of the Global North. This reification has led to the
notion that there is little value in understanding the Global South as a site of unique legal knowledge
with rich legal traditions.49 Third, the indifference demonstrated by scholars of the Global North is based
on an alleged formalism of the laws in the Global South, which ostensibly demonstrates the Global
South’s backwardness and underdevelopment. The fourth argument that Bonilla presents is that the
academic knowledge production of the Global North is deemed to be much more robust than the
academic knowledge production in the Global South. Finally, Bonilla stipulates that the “closed and
parochial character of U.S. legal academy, along with the selective openness of most of Western
Europe’s legal academy, discourages any dialogue with the legal institutions of the Global South”.50

47
48
49
50

Bonilla, “Introduction”, supra note 32 at 29.
Ibid at 4.
Ibid at 6.
Ibid at 11.
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Building on these five general claims, Bonilla generates three rules that “govern the production,
circulation, and use of legal knowledge”.51 These three rules are: the Well of Production rule52; the
Protected Designation of Origin rule53; and the Effective Operator rule.54
According to the Well of Production rule, the Global North is the only place that is able to produce
legal knowledge. This implies that the Global South is incapable of producing original knowledge and
that the Global South simply replicates knowledge from other sources. Bonilla is accurate in his
description of this normative tendency, which is prevalent in how scholars theorise global governance
today. When discussing the descriptive accounts of global constitutionalism for example, there is a
propensity to rely on European models, European authors and the European experience.55 This is similar
for the global administrative law scholars who are from Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. In the discussions
about the descriptive accounts of global constitutionalism, Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein rely on
principles from the European Union and its adjudicatory frameworks as an illustration of global
constitutionalism.56 Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein’s global constitutionalism is then meant to be
applicable worldwide, in particular as it relates to global governance institutions that operate in the
Global South.
The second rule – the Protected Designation of Origin rule- suggests that all knowledge produced in
the North should be respected and recognised. This insight is extremely valuable to my analysis. Even
though scholars from the Global South (and their allies) are active in international law and its
institutions, their critical perspectives and interventions are not adopted into the literature of global
administrative law57 and global constitutionalism.58
This critique is similar to the reflections of Richard Delgado in 1992 about civil rights scholarship.
Delgado noted that an: “inner circle of twenty-six scholars, all male and white, occupied the central
arenas of civil rights scholarship to the exclusion of contributions of minority scholars. When a member
of this inner circle wrote about civil rights issues he cited almost exclusively to other members of the
circle for support”.59 Similarly, in the discussions about global administrative law and global
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

58

59

Ibid at 9.
“This states that the only context for the production of knowledge is the legal academia in the North”; Ibid.
“This indicates that all knowledge produced in the North is worthy of respect and recognition per se, given the context
from which it emerges”; Ibid at 10.
“This rule indicates that academics and legal institutions from the North are much better trained to make effective and
legitimate use of legal knowledge than academics and legal institutions from the South”; Ibid at 11.
Peters & Armingeon, supra note 4.
Jan Klabbers, “Setting the Scene” in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein, eds, The Constitutionalization of
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
In the context of global administrative law, the main interlocutors often cite to Bhupinder Chinmni’s work on global
administrative law. This reference simply acknowledges that there are scholars like Chimni that challenge the central
assertions of global administrative law from the perspective of the Third World. For a recent example, see Stewart,
“Normative Dimensions”, supra note 11 at 499.
With the exception of Oklopcic, supra note 6; Peer C Zumbansen, “The Incurable Constitutional Itch: Transnational
Private Regulatory Governance and the Woes of Legitimacy” in Michael Helfand, ed, The Challenges of Global and
Local Legal Pluralism: Mediating State and Non-State Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Richard Delgado, “The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How To Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later” (1992) 140
U Pa L Rev at 1352 [Delgado, “Imperial Scholar”].
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constitutionalism, there is a reluctance to even acknowledge the presence of Third World-based
scholarship.60
The final rule, that of the Effective Operator - indicates that, when compared to their Global South
counterparts, the institutions and the academic communities of the Global North are much better
equipped and trained to make use of legal knowledge. An illustrative example is the role of western
experts in international law and its institutions.61 As I have argued elsewhere, western experts dominate
the field of international criminal law.62 These international criminal law experts move quickly from one
tribunal to another, taking with them their particular set of expertise.63 Their good intentions, however,
are clouded by the known unknowns.64 These known unknowns are characterised as a “lack of local
knowledge of post-conflict settings, whether that is knowledge of the local legal system, local facts,
local culture or any other relevant information”.65 Building on from my earlier claims then, international
institutions, especially within the international criminal context, privilege western experts to the
detriment of the local experts, which then reinforces Bonilla’s effective operator rule. More importantly,
international criminal law and its institutions are often identified as an exemplary illustration of global
constitutionalism.66
It is clear that Bonilla’s contributions signify a number of important observations about global
administrative law and global constitutionalism. The first rule, the Well of Production, is visible in the
discussions on accountability of international law and its institutions. Even though there are significant
overtures to include scholars from the Global South (especially in terms of their physical presence in
edited collections, journal articles, and conferences67), the current field of global governance theory visà-vis international law and its institutions can be characterised as devoid of contextual analysis from the
perspective of the Global South.68 For example, there is an assumption that Northern scholars’ cursory
60
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Amarnath Amarasingam & Daniel Bass, eds, Post-War Sri Lanka: Problems and Prospects (New York: Hurst
University Press, 2015) [Xavier, “Looking for ‘Justice’”].
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Ibid at 383.
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2005) 457 at 461-72.
Chimni, “Co-option”, supra note 6.
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top-down view of how international institutions operate may capture how these international institutions
function in their respective places, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s operations
in Arusha, Tanzania. This argument reinforces Bonilla’s positing that the “only context for the
production of knowledge is the legal academia in the North”.69 By ignoring the relevant discussions
about the Global South, including the critical insights of the subaltern studies movement70 and its
progenies,71 there is a reliance on the “Well of Production” rule in global governance theories.72
The second and third rules - “Protected Designation of Origin”73 and “Effective Operator”74 - are
very much present in discussions about international law and its institutions. We can discern that
Northern legal knowledge production is worthy of respect and recognition “per se, given the context
from which it emerges”.75 This can be illustrated by the failures of global administrative lawyers and
global constitutionalism scholars to incorporate critical insights from and about the Global South.76
Relying on Bonilla’s scholarship, it is clear that the current state of global governance theory,
especially global constitutionalism and global administrative law, is replete with shortcomings. While
not an exhaustive account, this analysis forms the backdrop to the central issues being pursued in this
paper: should we learn from the Global South and how can we learn from the Global South? In the
following sections, I take up these two questions respectively.
III. THEORISING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH?
With the above framing, this section of the paper further examines scholarly interventions that
suggest we should turn to the Global South as a site of knowledge production. In answering the
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from which it emerges”; Bonilla, “Introduction,” supra note 32 at 10.
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Ibid at 8-10.
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question; should we turn to the Global South, I will focus on the writings of various scholars from
different fields including anthropology, sociology and international law. What is certain is that there is a
clear body of literature that calls for a reorientation towards the Global South as means to transcend the
Eurocentricity of western social science.
Once I have explored the claims, then the analysis will lead into an examination of the reconstructive
elements embedded in TWAIL. Over the past 20 years, TWAIL scholars have sought to critically
evaluate international law and its institutions. Unfortunately, these interventions have not had significant
influence in global governance theory,77 in particular, global administrative law or global
constitutionalism.78 Accordingly, I use this space to examine the diverse arguments housed under the
moniker of TWAIL in order to understand its reformist agenda and to embed it within conversations on
global governance.
A. Interdisciplinary Reorientation towards the Global South
Contemporary interdisciplinary scholarship has built upon a tradition of critique by questioning how
the empire speaks to, and speaks about, the metropole. Anthropologists have been actively calling for a
reorientation towards the Global South. In this vein, Jean and John Comaroff’s 2012 Theory From The
South is a text rich in ideas. They start by noting that western enlightenment has “posited itself as the
wellspring of universal learning, of Science and Philosophy, upper case”.79 Western englightment
simultaneously has characterised its other, the Global South “as a place of parochial wisdom, of
antiquarian traditions, of exotic ways and means. Above all, of unprocessed data. These other worlds, in
short, are treated less as sources of refined knowledge than as reservoirs of raw fact”.80 Comaroff and
Comaroff further sugget that in combating the eurocentrism of the various disciplines, we should invert
the order of things:
But what if, and here is the idea in interrogative form, we invert that Order of Things?
What if we posit that, in the present moment, it is the so-called ‘Global South’ that
affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at large? That it is from here that
our empirical grasp of its lineaments, and our theory-work in accounting for them, ought
to be coming, at least in major part?81

77

78

79
80
81

Fassbender, “History”, supra note 60 at 2; A recent exception to the rule is Oklopcic, supra note 6 at 203. A similar
question was raised by Critical Race Scholars in the United States in the early 1980s; see for example Richard Delgado,
“The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?” (1987) 22 Harv CR-CLL Rev 301;
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Their proposal to “invert the order of things” is based on the realisation that contemporary actors, norms,
and processes are reconfiguring our understandings of the core-and-periphery. Because of the processes
of globalisation, the Global South is experiencing “some of the most innovative and energetic modes of
producing value” and this is the “driving impulse of contemporary capitalism as both a material and
cultural formation”.82 Whether it is to mine mineral resources83 or sew shirts, it is an accepted fact that
most materials are now produced cheaply and quickly in the Global South. Moreover, various modes of
governance techniques are being deployed in the Global South. In order to grasp the history of the
present, both empirically and theoretically, Comaroff and Comaroff suggest that we must study the
Global South.84 As the acceleration of the various modes of production by different actors, processes,
and norm generators expand, it is the Global South that is experiencing these repercussions first. This
insight is invaluable for the current purpose of how we theorise global governance. As international
lawyers like David Kennedy have suggested, the Global South is where the global governance rubber
hits the road.85
As seen from the discussion about the meaning of the Global South, scholars have theorised the
Eurocentricity of modernity beyond the field of anthropology.86 Suggestions emerging out of the field of
anthropology are similar to proposals by scholars such as Santos and Connell who to turn to the Global
South as a site of knowledge production. Connell, whose interventions have been characterised as an
attempt at global sociology87, has turned to southern theory by examining specific locations in the
Global South and tracing the social theorising therein. Santos too has called for greater espistemologies
of the South.88
Ultimately, these interdisciplinary contributions suggest that we should learn further from the Global
South. Even within the field of international law, Third World scholars have been calling for a turn to
the Global South through networks like Third World Approaches to International Law.
B. Third World Approaches to International Law [TWAIL]
TWAIL’s origins can be attributed to an emergence of both reactive and proactive scholarship against
the various colonial and imperial projects of international law. The first ever TWAIL conference was
organised at Harvard Law School in 1997.89 The movement has since grown, and now includes scholars
from diverse disciplines and locations. Accordingly, there have been a number of conferences, with the
most recent taking place in 2015 in Cairo, Egypt. Given the origins of its first conference, TWAIL’s
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foundations are rooted in critical scholarship, especially US legal realism, critical legal studies,
feminism and critical race theory.90 TWAIL’s origins can also be located in postcolonial theory.91
Historically, TWAIL scholars have themselves identified two generational moments in the
development of TWAIL scholarship.92 This type of periodization however is susceptible to challenges.93
TWAIL can be characterised as an anti-hierarchical counter-hegemonic coalitionary movement that is
deeply suspicious of universal creeds and truths.94 It is anti-hierarchical because it challenges the
Eurocentricity of the history of international law and continued propagation of particular monolithic
universal values therein. These include specific claims to global administrative law and global
constitutionalism as universal creeds.95 In a subversive turn, TWAIL scholars suggest a dialogic
maneuver across cultures. TWAIL calls for the recognition of existing inequities within the structures of
international law. It also calls for the recognition of the subaltern voices and demands that all voices be
represented.96
Broadly, the movement’s unifying raison d'être is to: “challenge the hegemony of the dominant
narratives of international law, in large part by teasing out encounters of difference along many axesrace, class, gender, sex, ethnicity, economics, trade etc. – and in inter-disciplinary ways – social,
theoretical, epistemological, ontological and so on”.97 By challenging these dominant narratives,
TWAIL seeks to “reduce the distance of the world of international law from the lives of ordinary
peoples”.98
Makau W. Mutua formulated TWAIL’s three central tenets in 2000.99 The first is to understand,
deconstruct, and unpack the uses of international law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a
racialised hierarchy of international norms and institutions that sub-ordinate non-Europeans and
Europeans alike.100 Contemporary TWAIL scholarship can be grouped under the auspices of these
tenets. The second component of TWAIL is much more prescriptive in that it seeks to create alternative
normative legal edifices for international governance. This is what I hope to achieve in this article.
Third, through policy scholarship, TWAIL scholars aim to eradicate the conditions of underdevelopment
in the Global South (through praxis for example).101 This reformist agenda presents a natural
opportunity for building bridges between conceptions of global governance and critical insights about
the Global South.
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A number of scholars are using the reformist elements of TWAIL. The fundamental task of these
scholars is to articulate the emancipatory ideals housed in international law. These overtures are
analogous to the arguments deployed by earlier TWAIL scholars, who called for the emancipation of the
former colonies using international law.102
Nevertheless, compelling arguments from these international law scholars have not garnered much
influence on substantive reforms or within theoretical debates. For example, in the fields of international
criminal law and transitional justice, TWAIL scholars are quite active in describing the problematic
nature of prosecutions of international criminal institutions,103 polemics of transitional justice,104 or sole
focus of prosecution by the International Criminal Court in Africa.105 Such projects reinforce the claim
made in 1983 by the first Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere that “[i]n international rule making, we
[the Third World] are recipients not participants”.106 Given the inequities perpetuated by the on-going
proselytisation of western values, there is a need to interrupt this narrative and reimagine a better future.
This is a future that includes the various places and peoples of the Global South as both recipients and
active participants in international law and its theories.
Critics of TWAIL allude to its potential for nihilism.107 The charge of nihilism is predicated on
TWAIL scholars’ critical position towards international law. These claims of nihilism ignore TWAIL’s
reformist aims. It is precisely these neglected reformist aims that I seek to excavate and place in
conversations with global governance theorising. In this regard, analogous to the other disciplines and
other fields of law that I discussed earlier in this section, TWAIL too calls for a reorientation towards
the Global South. The reformist elements housed within TWAIL are part of this reorientation and I will
elaborate on these claims in the following sections.
There is another line of criticism that has centred on the Marxist tradition. Robert Knox argues that
TWAIL scholarship is wedded to liberal legalism.108 Using the idea of principled opportunism,109 Knox
suggests that TWAIL, and critical scholarship in general, must now rethink its efforts to achieve
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systemic change. His fear is that by focusing on immediate concerns, TWAIL scholars lose track of the
larger strategy. Those committed to a better world end up confusing the current tactic for immediate
gains with the overall strategy of broader systemic change.110 Knox is absolutely correct in his
observation. This paper is written in this tradition of trying to move beyond the immediate tactics that
Knox is critical of, to one where we can theorise global governance from the vantage point of the Global
South and usher in participation of the various stakeholders in the Global South.
Having identified a variety of perspectives that argue in favour of a reorientation towards the Global
South and setting out TWAIL’s foundational pillars, I will now elaborate on TWAIL’s prescriptive
components as it relates to the question: how can we learn from the Global South in theorising global
governance?
IV. RESISTANCE AND RENEWAL: HOW TO LEARN FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH?
While current TWAIL literature can be categorized as a form of resistance, it is also important to
remember the suggestions for reform.111 As referenced earlier, the first tenet of TWAIL is to deconstruct
and unpack the existing hierarchies within international law and its institutions. The current TWAIL
literature, written in this genre, seeks to challenge western universalism in particular.
A small number of contemporary academics are working on reformative projects under the auspice of
TWAIL. These projects seek to redeem international law’s promise.112 These writers have sought to
harness the emancipatory power of international law. Not entirely dissimilar to their predecessors,
academics working under the more contemporary umbrella of TWAIL are hopeful of international law’s
potential and do not reject international law altogether.113 These scholars argue for a reconstruction of
international law in a manner that reflects the concerns of the Global South.114
One such example is the scholarship of Balakrishan Rajagopal. Even though he recognizes that such
attempts may render minimal results,115 he suggests that it is “legitimate to use international law as an
explicit counter-hegemonic tool of resistance”.116 The current TWAIL scholarship is hopeful that
international law can realise its emancipatory potential. An illustration of this hopefulness is apparent in
Antony Anghie’s writing:
110
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I continue to hope, together with the many scholars who are working to reconstruct
international law precisely because of their awareness of the many ways in which it has
operated to exclude and subordinate people on account of their gender, race and poverty,
that international law can be transformed into a means by which the marginalized may be
empowered. In short, that law can play its ideal role in limiting and resisting power. At
the very least, I believe that the Third World cannot abandon international law because
law now plays such a vital role in the public realm in the interpretation of virtually all
international events.117
Even though the hopefulness expressed by Anghie and other TWAIL scholars has been the subject of
a recent debate,118 it is certain that there are at least two potential prescriptive claims that we can discern
in answering the question of how can we learn from the Global South in theorising global governance.
The first claim, forged as a response to TWAIL’s flirtations with monism119, is to take stock of
international law as a field of practice and to expand ethnographic research that is committed to a
TWAIL-based ideology. Here the argument centres on the potential use of ethnography as a means to
study the field of international law from the perspective of the Global South and to provide insights into
how global governance mechanisms affect the daily-lived realities of the people of the Global South.120
The second centres on the ethical duty of international lawyers and international law scholars to
contend with the material reality of the Global South. In this section I argue that as intellectuals,
international lawyers and international law scholars we have an ethical responsibility to articulate
accurate portrayals of global governance initiatives and its effects on the lives of the people of the
Global South.
A. International Law as a Field of Practice
Some writers believe that while TWAIL scholars engage in thoughtful political arguments that lead
them to the edge of the abyss, they are nonetheless unable to go beyond the precipice because they are
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wedded to monist understandings of law.121 Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja make the argument that,
for TWAIL scholars, international law’s promise resides in its universality, nothwithstanding their very
own critique that international law carries with it its own particularities.122 The belief in the promise of
international law, they suggest, is a circular argument. Eslava and Pahuja suggest: “Such an attempt
would be to engage in a neo-Kantian enterprise of finding a new, genuinely universal ground for law.
TWAIL’s concern for history has shown us repeatedly that these ostensibly genuine universals
invariably end up elevating a particular meaning to the universal […]”.123
Eslava and Pahuja’s intervention signals a warning to TWAIL’s reformist agenda. What we can
gather from their analysis is rather prescriptive. They hint that TWAIL’s political project calls for the
recognition of a universality. To them, it is a normative conception of international law’s promise of
universalism and they see it as being “quasi-transcendent”.124 There is no material reality at the moment
in which to achieve emancipation as a result of TWAIL’s criticisms. Such recognition gives way to the
potential of plurality. In effect, they posit a moving away from monist conceptions of international law
to one that envisions international law as a domain of practice.125
In this imagining, we are able to rely on international law’s specific procedures, “artefacts and forms
of being that operate at the mundane and quotidian level and that tie together a vast raft of
heterogeneous phenomena in a specific kind of way”.126 TWAIL’s body of scholarship has already
identified political, cultural and economic biases buried deep within the structure of international law.
Eslava and Pahuja’s approach would shed light on how these embedded vernaculars affect the day-today lives of those that must confront the effects of international law.127
In a similar vein, Obiora Okafor argues that TWAIL is a theory and method.128 This proposal
seriously pushes for a methodological shift that echo’s the concerns of others scholars like Eslava and
Pahuja and I adopt this perspective. Thinking about TWAIL as a method and a theory “build[s]
explicitly on the legal-ethnographic method currently being applied explicitly in international sites and
artefacts such as international criminal courtrooms or international NGOs”.129 Eslava and Pahuja call for
an ethos of ethnography as TWAIL’s new unexplored frontier in which scholarship seeks to identify
embedded biases in multiple registers. This suggestion to conduct more ethnographies is a general claim
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with an understanding that there are multiple types of ethnographies in various institutions and normproducing spaces.
Ethnography as a general field of study is intricately connected to social sciences like anthropology
and sociology. It is a method of study deployed by social scientists, including legal scholars. It is
generally understood as the study of people in “naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by methods of
data collection which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving the researcher
participating directly in the setting”.130 The purpose is to collect data in a systematic fashion without
externally imposing meaning.131
Ethnography, an anthropological method, was the handmaiden of colonialism and imperialism.132 At
its inception, it was used as a means to track and study the Indigenous populations of the newly
discovered world by various colonisers.133 This field of study has evolved, integrating insights from
various disciplines and theoretical positions, including postmodernism and colonialism.134 In particular,
there is a burgeoning sub-field of critical ethnography that focuses on power relations and effective
systemic changes “toward greater freedom and equity”.135
Most recently, Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson has added another layer to the discussions about
ethnography that is premised on the politics of refusal. This is important when thinking about
ethnography as a potential tool in learning how to theorise global governance from the perspective of the
Global South. Simpson coins her intervention the “cartography of refusal,” which requires an
acknowledgment of the role of ethnography in constructing and defining Indigenous groups and their
politics.136 In describing this refusal, Simpson notes:
These conditions [imperialism and settler colonialism and the role of law and
anthropology in constructing Indigenous identity] have led to this book as an ethnography
that pivots upon refusal(s). I am interested in the larger picture, the discursive, material
and moral territory that was simultaneously historical and contemporary (this “national”
space) and the ways in which Kahnawa'kehró:non had refused the authority of the state at
almost every turn and in doing so instantiated a different political authority. […]
There is no place in the existing literature for these articulations; nor is there now a neat
placement for them within postcolonial studies or analysis. Kahnawa'kehró:non were not
free from occupation, which naturalized as immigration, as multiculturalism, and was and
is a legalized, settler occupation of the territory that they claim. Thus there was no
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doubleness to their political consciousness, a still-colonial but striving-to-be
“postcolonial consciousness,” that denied the modern self, which Frantz Fanon, Homi
Bhabha, and Anthony Giddens speak of and from […]. Here I want to push “turning
away” into the ambit of refusal - of simply refusing the gaze of disengagement - and to
the possibilities that this structures: subject formation, but also politics and resurgent
histories. In my ethnographic work I was deeply mindful of the range of possibilities
available for political life, for identification and identity within and against recognition,
all instantiated in refusals. There seemed, rather, to be a tripleness, a quadrupleness to
consciousness and an endless play, and it something like this: I am me, I am what you
think I am, I am who this person to the right of me thinks I am, and you are all full of
shit, and then maybe I will tell you to your face and let me tell you who you are.137
This new layer adds further nuance to the study of ethnography. Simpson’s suggestion has a
significant amount of potential for future TWAIL-based ethnographies about the material reality of the
people of the Global South. Not only does she suggest that there are distinctions between the concerns of
the people of the Global South and Indigenous communities, Simpson posits the idea of using
ethnography as both a form of resistance and as a tool of emancipation. These critical insights about
ethnography must be taken into account and included in any turn to empiricism, especially ethnography,
as a method to learn from the Global South.
We must return to Eslava and Pahuja’s suggestion for further empirical and ethnographic scholarship
in international law with an understanding that this field of study is multifaceted with its own
boundaries. More importantly, the call for ethnographic research and empirical studies is not new.
Rather it is part of a rich history in interrogations imbedded in critical approaches to law. Social
scientists too have contributed to our understanding of law from varying disciplines utilising different
methods. This type of turn to empiricism in law is also not new. It can be traced back to the early
1900s.138
The move towards ethnographies from the Global South as a means to theorise global governance is,
I argue part of TWAL’s reformist agenda. This turn to empiricism does offer us the potential to map the
existing material reality, relying on data collected based on observations of the everyday in places like
Palestine, Sri Lanka, South Africa and other such locations. These observations can capture the social
meanings of everyday occurrences in international law and its institutions. There are a handful of
examples of scholars who have provided such analysis.139 For instance, Luis Eslava has undertaken an
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ethnographic analysis of international development policies in changing the internal dynamics of
Bogota, Colombia.140 But we need more such scholarship, especially as it relates to lived realities of the
people of the Global South and how global governance mechanisms affect their daily lives.
The complexity of conducting ethnographic work is elevated when theorising global governance
from the perspective of the Global South. We must contend with this complexity and should heed Audra
Simpson’s warnings. Taking stock of the work of critical ethnographers and the interventions by
Simpson, there is a need to engage in this type of scholarship with a commitment to the politics of the
Global South. Much more importantly, in undertaking this type of work, scholars must engage with, and
be aware of the politics of recognition141 and the politics of refusal.142 The politics of recognition centre
on the possibility of engaging the contemporary western legal orders as a means to make material
changes.143 Ultimately the moves to engage any colonial structure will undoubtedly reinforce the
“colonial state power” (both actual and symbolic).144
The politics of refusal is centred on the resistance to the settler colonial endgame - the elimination of
the Indigenous identity. It is about the possibility of surviving, resisting and refusing.145 Interestingly,
the politics of refusal signals the possibilities of living and resisting without engaging in practices that
lead to subjugation brought about by colonialism and imperialism in socities in the Global South and in
settler nations.
What we can learn from Eslava and Pahuja’s articulation of international law as practice is the need
to examine the broader context in which international law and international institutions function. It is
necessary to be attuned to the socio-political, cultural and economic factors that surround the examples
that are used to denote the legitimacy of international law and its institutions. The exercise of thinking
about international law and its institutions as a field of practice shifts our perspective away from one
centred on formal international legal mechanisms. By repositioning our attention to the realm of
practice, we are able to take note of divergent factors that shape the operationalisation of international
norms on the ground, or where the rubber of global governance hits the road.146
B. International Lawyers, International Law Scholars and Ethics
Lassa Oppenheim’s suggestion in 1908 – that international lawyers should plough their fields – is still
very relevant today.147 Within the scholarship about global constitutionalism, global administrative law,
public international law, and global governance, international lawyers and international law scholars
craft the territorial boundaries of their respective subfields. Much more importantly, these outputs,
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especially those of learned jurists, are elevated to the status of sources of international law.148 The expert
opinions of scholars, by way of sources of international law through the ICJ Statute, then become
applicable in the everyday practices of the people of the Global South as part of the globalisation of
international law through international institutions.
These practical implications about the very nature of international legal practice are analogous to, and
bound up in, concerns that domestic practitioners and domestic legal professional regulatory bodies
often grapple with.149 These implications centre on such questions as: What is the role of the
international lawyer and international law scholars in contemporary society?150 What are the
professional responsibilities and obligations of international lawyers to their clients, and much more
importantly, who exactly is their client? What is the significance of the international lawyer or
international law scholar’s understanding of context in delivering opinion (for example do they have
competent understanding of Rwandan history or Yugoslavian politics)?
In this section, I argue that it is important for international lawyers and international law scholars to
recognise and be aware of the material and lived realities of the Global South. It is their duty as
intellectuals to portray events in a broader context, describing various portions of people that may be
differently affected by the manner in which international law and its institutions function. Taking stock
of the material lived realities of the people of the Global South is one way to learn from the Global
South.
Various legal professions regulate the provision of legal services in national jurisdictions. In the
Global South, legal transplants have ushered in professional bodies that are similar to their former
colonial masters.151 As seen in Sri Lanka, the legal profession is regulated by a law society that
functions akin to those found in the United Kingdom, Canada and the rest of the Commonwealth.
Domestic legal practitioners have been trained to adopt a specific attitude in how they behave with their
clients.152 Local lawyers, depending on their respective jurisdictions, are heavily regulated through the
respective rules of conduct by their professional bar. A lawyer’s professional license is contingent upon
ethical behaviour towards the client, the court, the legal community, and the general public.
In the international context, there is no such governing regulatory framework. James Crawford
suggests that “[t]here is clearly no international law bar comparable to domestic bars – there are no
qualifications which someone must attain before appearing before international courts and tribunals, no
international code of ethics with which they must comply, and no international association to sanction
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them for misconduct”.153 There is only a fragmented set of rules that apply to advocates and counsels
before the International Criminal Court, the ad hoc tribunals and other such organisations.154 Without
reinforcing the liberal legalism imbedded within these professional regulatory regimes,155 the questions
that fuel this part of the discussion are, to what extent should international lawyers take note of the
Global South and its material reality, and do they even have an obligation to do so? Questions such as
these underscore the responsibility of international lawyers and international scholars in a regulatory
space devoid of formal regulation.156
It is important to note the overlap between international lawyers and international law scholars.
Throughout this analysis, I have referred to a number of scholars who are both international lawyers and
international law scholars. James Crawford is a good example as he is an established academic with a
long history of teaching in Australia, the United Kingdom, and other countries. Crawford is also an
established international lawyer. He was counsel in a number of leading international law cases before
the International Court of Justice.157 Crawford was recently appointed to the International Court of
Justice. In a similar vein, a number of scholars have demonstrated the connections between the role of
specific international lawyers and the development of international law (M. Cherif Bassiouni is a good
example).158 So, given the fragmented nature of the various standards of conduct and the various roles
performed by international lawyers and international law scholars, it may be more useful to think of
these individuals, given their overlapping functions, as intellectuals engaged in praxis of international
law.
Various writers have theorised the role of intellectuals in our modern society.159 Edward Said’s
contributions are especially significant. Said states: “the principal intellectual duty is the search for
153
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relative independence from such [societal] pressures. Hence my characterizations of the intellectual as
exile and marginal, as amateur, and as the author of a language that tries to speak the truth to power”.160
The latter point is of particular importance in answering the question: to what extent should
international lawyers and international law scholars take note of the Global South and its material
reality?161 It is important because international lawyers and international law scholars, as intellectuals,
are constantly imbricated in milieus of power and authority that shape the lived realities of the people of
the Global South. Said suggests that intellectuals should move away from specific specialisation (or as
he coins it professionalisation) to the much more accessible attitude of an amateur. 162
Said helps us move away from an understanding of international lawyers and international law
scholars as specialised professionals embarking on their duties by ploughing their respective fields.
Rather, Said forces the examination of the material reality of the work that international lawyers and
international law scholars undertake in shaping and writing their fields. In effect, this contention requires
us to come face to face with those that are directly affected by the laws and policies that are shaped and
created by intellectuals working with international law.
Recently, Bhupinder Chimni captured one of the central concerns of TWAIL as part of its reformist
agenda: Is human emancipation and environmental protection possible “by altering the material
structures or does it require an evolved ethical and spiritual self?”163 He enquires about the role of
international lawyers (and international law scholars) in thinking, and bringing about equitable relations
amongst nations states and those that live in these constructed boundaries.164
Chimni acknowledges that the Marxist tradition, which he has relied on to deliver his TWAIL-based
arguments against international law, is not useful in providing adequate insights for reform. This is
especially the case because of the “uneasy experience of actually existing socialism” that we
experienced over the years that is rooted in “philosophy of militant materialism as a basis for building a
world that expands the realm of human freedom”.165
Chimni subsequently turns to Gandhi’s 1904 Hind Swaraj to find inspiration for some of the central
organising tensions embedded in TWAIL. The rationale for this choice is based on the relationship that
Gandhi constructs between the self and social transformation as a critique of modern civilisation.
Building on Hind Swaraj, Chimni seeks to address Marxism’s failings by clarifying the need to be
simultaneously “attentive to material structures and to work on the self”.166 He proposes a number of
critical observations that attempt to fill these gaps. By drawing directly from Gandhi, Chimni maps out a
number of significant proposals about the state, the grounds for obedience to laws, the understanding of
the legal profession and passive resistance.167 By reflecting on these important factors, Chimni reveals
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glimpses into alternative global futures, the means by which we can create a better world, and locate the
role of international law and international lawyers in that process.168
In this regard, I want to hone in on one of the central themes that Chimni identifies in creating a
better world - the function and role of international lawyers and by extension international law
scholars.169 Focusing on this proposal about international lawyers and international law scholars opens
up new vistas in imagining various futures from the perspectives of the Global South.
Gandhi’s criticisms about the legal profession were based on the role of the courts and lawyers in
maintaining and sustaining the colonial rule and the oppression of the people of the Global South.
Gandhi’s cynicism about the legal profession was precipitated by the disparity between the colonised
and colonisers, and the resulting unequal treatment between the European right bearers and nonEuropeans without rights. His cynical views extended further to the belief that the legal profession
teaches immorality because lawyers benefit from conflicts that they seek to mediate. Chimni explicates
some of these implications for international lawyers and international law scholars with the following:
In my view Gandhi’s critique of the legal profession raises crucial issues with respect to
the responsibility of international lawyers. I will flag some of them. The first matter
relates to the role of the legal adviser to governments. In giving advice should legal
advisers privilege truth, read as the global common good and our common humanity, over
perceived national interests? Should a legal adviser do a Gandhi to his client if truth were
not spoken with regard to the material facts in issue? Secondly, should international
lawyers charge exorbitant fees even when that prevents poor individuals and nations from
seeking justice? Thirdly, are international lawyers willing to assume personal
responsibility for particular interpretations of international law with troubling outcomes
for subaltern groups and peoples in the world? Can the ethical self use the legal form as a
shield to deflect criticisms? Finally, does a shadow fall between the ideals that often
inform the writings of international lawyers and their practices in their professional lives?
An example of the latter is the jostling for power and positions in universities and
professional bodies. The shadow between aspiration and practice is not unique to any
profession or vocation. In many ways it represents mundane reality. The point is that
modern professions are subject to an inner dynamic that occludes reaction on the ethical
self. What we can learn from Gandhi is that in a very profound sense (to invert Ludwig
Wittgenstein) deeds are words.170
It is imperative that those making legal decisions about the very nature of particular regimes become
aware of the lived reality of the Global South and the dynamics that spur on international law and its
institutions. The Report of the UN Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri
Lanka's (March 2011) recommendation for the establishment of an “independent international
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mechanism” is a good illustration.171 Were the drafters of this recommendation172 aware of the serious
problems with the role of the international criminal judiciary in amending the rules of evidence and
procedure, or the serious concerns over witnesses and the rights of the accused within the current
international ad hoc tribunals?173 Did they pay close attention to the manner in which witness testimony
is elicited before the international criminal tribunals? Why did the UN Panel of Experts recommend the
creation of an international mechanism when they should have known about the problems international
criminal institutions are facing? Unpacking the rationale for these questions is another project.174
International lawyers and scholars have an ethical obligation to relay their claims to actual evidence
from the ground (based on ethnographic research), rather than relying on antiquated notions about the
nature of law and our global society. Such a reflection arrives full circle to the various interdisciplinary
interventions that the Global South is a site for new learning about old problems. The various scholars
participating in these discussions argue that contemporary actors, norms and processes are reconfiguring
our understandings of the core-and-periphery.175 Thus to grasp the history of the present, both
empirically and theoretically, we must study the Global South.176
V. CONCLUSION
International law and international institutions are intimately involved in the lives of the people of the
Global South. Yet theories of global governance such as global constitutionalism and global
administrative law are limited in their scope, and ignore the significant importance of the Global South
within the global order. Throughout this paper, I tackled the means by which we can move these
problems. As a means to build bridges between theories of global governance and the people of Global
South, I articulated a modest proposal of engagement to link global governance with the Global South
and incorporate its respective literature.
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In this paper, I relied on interdisciplinary insights to address current gaps in global governance
theories (global constitutionalism and global administrative law). This article was organised around
whether or not there is a need to learn from the Global South when theorising global governance, and if
that need exists, how can we gain this knowledge?
At the outset, I explored the state of current global governance and suggested that it was
predominantly Eurocentric. Then I posited that by attempting to answer both questions of should we
learn from the Global South and how can we learn from the Global South, we can begin to transcend
these limitations. In answering the first question of should we learn from the Global South, I relied on
interdisciplinary scholarship and scholars working under the moniker of TWAIL to suggest that this
question has already been answered.
In answering how we can learn from the Global South, I advanced two arguments. First, that
international law and its institutions are mediated, moulded, and mitigated by multiple political and
material forces. With that understanding, theories of global governance should take these factors into
account by approaching international law and its institutions as a field of practice. Doing so invites a
realisation that there is a need for further investigation of lived realities and the on-the-ground effects of
global governance. This, in turn warrants the need for more robust ethnographic research, which can
better chronicle the effects of global governance on the people of the Global South. Similarly, my
second argument sought to locate the role of the international law scholar and international lawyer in
contending with the lived realities of the Global South. I argued that as intellectuals, both international
lawyers and international law scholars have a duty to transform and improve the material reality of the
people of the Global South.
In the end, this paper has raised more questions than it has provided concrete answers. However, it is
apparent that there is much work to be done to reorient how we theorise global governance. Increasingly
robust ethnographies focusing on the various global governance institutions and their relationship to the
Global South are urgently needed. Within the field of international criminal law, for example, there is a
need to trace how local officials in countries like Sri Lanka handle the process of transitional justice.
How judges and advocates before the local courts conceptualise and articulate transitional justice in both
public and private law matters. By thinking about the local responses to transitional justice, a more
fulsome international understanding can be developed.
What would global governance from the Global South entail? What does constitutionalism of the
South look like? What are its possible features? Why is this a viable project? Should scholars and
practitioners engage in this type of theorising?
These questions highlight the need for a theoretical foundation and an increasingly nuanced
understanding of how international law and its institutions are functioning in the global order. By
building bridges between theory and practice, between the Global South and global governance, we
ensure that international law, international institutions and global governance can be inclusive of the
people of the Global South.

